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THEORIES OF LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP 
T. Alexander Aleinikojf* 
On October 2, 1985, the United States Department of State 
stripped Rabbi Meir Kahane of his American citizenship. The State 
Department based its action on section 349(a)(4)(A) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA), 1 which provides for loss of American 
nationality for any U.S. citizen "accepting, serving in, or performing 
the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of 
a foreign state ... if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign 
state." Kahane came within this provision, the Department asserted, 
when he assumed a seat in the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) in Au-
gust 1984.2 Rabbi Kahane appealed to the State Department's Board 
of Appellate Review. On May 1, 1986, the Board in In re Kahane 
affirmed the administrative determination of loss of citizenship. 3 
The Supreme Court has all but eliminated the power of Congress 
to terminate U.S. citizenship without the consent of the citizen. "In 
the last analysis," the Court wrote in Vance v. Terrazas, "expatriation 
depends upon the will of the citizen rather than on the will of Con-
gress and its assessment of his conduct."4 Under this standard, it is 
difficult to understand the State Department's action against Kahane. 
Both before and after assuming his Knesset seat, Kahane informed the 
State Department that he had no intention of relinquishing U.S. citi-
zenship. And the State Department has acknowledged that Kahane 
"has a strong and admitted motive"5 for retaining U.S. citizenship: as 
a citizen, Kahane may enter and leave this country virtually as a mat-
ter of will - a right that would be lost if citizenship were terminated. 6 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1974, Swarthmore College; J.D. 1977, 
Yale University. - Ed. I would like to thank Rachel Cohen, Thomas Green, Donald Herzog, 
David Martin, Terrance Sandalow, Peter Schuck, Joseph Weiler, and participants at a seminar 
on Interpretation and Community at the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem, December 
1985, for their thoughtful comments. 
1. 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a)(4)(A) (1982). 
2. Kahane became a citizen of Israel under the Israeli Law of Return, which authorizes the 
granting of citizenship to any Jew who settles in Israel. 
3. In re Kahane (Dept. of State, Board of Appellate Review, May 1, 1986) (unpublished, on 
file at Michigan Law Review). 
4. 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980). 
5. Brief of Appellee, Department of State, at 37, Kahane [hereinafter cited as State Depart-
ment Brief]. 
6. If the State Department's action is sustained in the courts, Kahane will have to apply for 
admission to the United States as an alien. As such, he would be subject to the various grounds 
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But in its brief to the Board of Appellate Review, the State Depart-
ment argued that Kahane's "actions speak louder than [his] words" in 
determining his true intent. Characterizing Kahane's statements as 
"self-serving," the Department argued that Kahane's writings and 
speeches demonstr~ted that he had "completely transferred allegiance 
to [Israel], thereby abandoning United States citizenship."7 
The Board of Appellate Review accepted the Department's reason-
ing. Referring to Kahane's "purposeful involvement over an extended 
period of time in the political life of [Israel]" and his admission that 
"his primary loyalty is to Israel," the Board concluded: 
Rabbi Kahane's voluntary acceptance of an important political post in 
the government of Israel is persuasive evidence of an intent to relinquish 
United States citizenship. . . . The declaration of allegiance he made to 
Israel also "provides substantial evidence" of an intent to abandon citi-
zenship. King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d at 1189. Other words and actions, 
which demonstrate unambiguously that he transferred his allegiance 
from the United States to Israel, supply overwhelming evidence of his 
"voluntary relinquishment" of United States citizenship. Measured 
against the foregoing evidence, Rabbi Kahane's disavowals in 1984 of an 
intent to relinquish citizenship and the fact that he has certain ties to and 
interests in the United States simply cannot be considered, as his counsel 
maintains, "strongly probative" of a lack of intent to abandon 
citizenship. 8 
One can readily agree with the Board that Kahane's statements 
cannot be conclusive on the issue of intent. (Imagine, for example, a 
gunman telling a victim, "Now, remember, I never intended to shoot 
you.") But the Board's decision cites no evidence that Kahane in-
tended to relinquish citizenship. That is hardly surprising. What rea-
son would Kahane have for voluntarily giving up U.S. citizenship? 
Kahane has not sought to avoid the military draft or American taxes.9 
Nor does Israeli law presently require candidates for political office to 
renounce citizenship of foreign states. Indeed, the Board's decision 
quotes Kahane's statement that he "would have long since given . . . 
up [U.S. citizenship] if I did not fear- and with justification- that if 
I gave it up, the American Government would place great obstacles 
of exclusion of the immigration laws. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a) (1982). The laws 
endow the executive branch with ample authority to keep out aliens whose entry it believes 
would be "prejudicial to the public interest." INA § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(27) (1982). 
Given Kahane's links to violent Jewish groups in the United States, he would stand a real risk of 
being denied entry. Furthermore, as the State Department pointed out in its brief, Kahane may 
be excludable on criminal grounds, based on his federal firearms conviction in 1971. State De· 
partment Brief, supra note 5, at 38 n.lb. See INA§ 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1982). 
7. State Department Brief, supra note 5, at 2, 19. 
8. Kahane at 13, 14. 
9. Cf. Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978), revd., 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (plaintiff 
renounced American citizenship apparently in order to avoid the draft). 
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... to enter America for lecture tours."10 Perhaps the Board is correct 
that Kahane has transferred allegiance to Israel, but clearly such a 
transfer can occur with no accompanying intent to relinquish the ben-
efits of U.S. citizenship. 
It appears that the State Department's action and the Board's deci-
sion are about something other than intent to relinquish U.S. citizen-
ship. But this shift to a focus on allegiance is not currently 
countenanced by the case law. Thus, the Kahane case may produce a 
reconsideration of the constitutional doctrine regarding loss of nation-
ality. The underlying issue that I address in this essay is whether the 
Constitution ought to be read to prohibit denationalization of U.S. cit-
izens. (I will use the term "denationalization" to refer to the govern-
ment's act of terminating citizenship. "Expatriation" will be used to 
refer to an individual's voluntary relinquishment of citizenship.) In 
examining this question, I will explore citizenship from four different 
perspectives - rights, consent, contract, and community - in search 
of a theoretical framework for the Supreme Court's doctrine in the 
denationalization cases. 
I. REASONS FOR DENATIONALIZATION 
One can imagine a number of reasons why a nation might want to 
terminate citizenship of individuals and groups. I will put denationali-
zation grounds into three categories: allegiance, punishment, and pub-
lic order. 
Citizenship is often thought of in terms of allegiance. From the 
earliest American naturalization laws, aliens seeking to become U.S. 
citizens have been required to "renounce and abjure absolutely and 
entirely all allegiance" to any foreign sovereign and "to bear true faith 
and allegiance" to "the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States."11 A person's breach or denial of allegiance may be viewed by 
some as severing the link between citizen and nation, thereby entitling 
the state to denationalize. 
Allegiance may be deemed to lapse in several situations. The most 
obvious is a transfer of allegiance. Such transfers are often explicit: a 
person will renounce citizenship of one nation and be naturalized in 
another. But there is no reason why transfer of allegiance may not 
occur without express renunciation. One may want to maintain the 
benefits of citizenship in one nation even if one's true allegiance is to 
10. Kahane at 14. 
11. INA § 337, 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1982). The requirement of this oath traces to an early 
nationality act. Act of Jan. 29, "1795, ch. 20, § l, 1 Stat. 414 (1798). 
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another. In such a situation, a country may seek to acknowledge the 
choice that the citizen has made - whether or not the citizen admits 
the transfer of allegiance. This, of course, is the State Department's 
position in the Kahane case. 
Allegiance is not necessarily indivisible. Just as people may feel 
loyalty to different family members, different groups, or different insti-
tutions of higher learning, so might a person have allegiance to more 
than one nation. Here the problem for the state is not a transfer of 
allegiance, but divided allegiance. Some may believe that a state may 
insist on undivided loyalty (as the United States does in its naturaliza-
tion oath); it may, like the two-timed lover, force the citizen to choose. 
A citizen may also demonstrate a lack of allegiance without having 
allegiance elsewhere. This is the situation of either active disloyalty 
(for example, treason 12) or simply no loyalty at all (apathy or uncon-
cern about the fate of the nation). To the extent a nation seeks a citi-
zenry dedicated to the support and defense of the country, it may want 
to rid itself of enemies13 or deadbeats. 
While we normally think of citizenship in allegiance terms, there is 
no a priori reason why denationalization must be linked to a lapse in 
one's allegiance. If citizenship is seen as granting benefits, a state may 
seek to deny such benefits to people it believes are unworthy of en-
joying them. Denationalization, on this account, may be justified as 
punishment. Congress has enacted several denationalization grounds 
that fall within this category, such as violation of laws against subver-
sion, draft evasion, and desertion from the armed forces in time of 
war. 14 Interestingly, these grounds have an "allegiance" ring to them. 
But nothing under the punishment theory would prevent denationali-
zation for any anti-social conduct - for example, murder, child abuse, 
or failure to pay taxes. 
A final set of denationalization grounds would include loss of citi-
zenship for individuals or groups that the state deems threats to public 
order. Such citizens may view themselves as loyal to the state, and 
they may not have violated any criminal laws; nonetheless the state 
may conclude that their membership in the nation poses a substantial 
problem for the maintenance of the status quo or the pursuit of other 
12. See INA § 349(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a)(7) (1982). 
13. In 1931, the Soviet Union imposed denationalization upon persons convicted of being 
"enemies of the toiling masses." McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: 
The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 942 (1974). 
14. INA§ 349(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a)(7) (1982) (subversion); Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, § 349(a)(8), 66 Stat. 267 (1952) (desertion), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95·432, § 2, 92 
Stat. 1046 (1978); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 349(a)(IO) (1952) (draft evasion), 
repealed by Pub. L. No. 94412, § 50l(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1258 (1976). 
June 1986] Loss of Citizenship 1475 
national objectives. Hannah Arendt has written powerfully of the 
mass denationalizations following World War I.15 The most horrific 
recent example is the "homelands" policy of South Africa: blacks liv-
ing in South Africa were stripped of South African citizenship and 
given citizenship in "independent" homelands based on tribal back-
ground.16 One can also imagine a state seeking to denationalize citi-
zens who are deemed dangerous to national security or who embroil 
the state in foreign controversies. 17 
II. DENATIONALIZATION AMERICAN STYLE 
Given this rather large number of situations in which denationali-
zation may be a rational state response to the conduct of its citizens, it 
is interesting that Congress has enacted denationalization legislation 
only sparingly. Indeed, for the first hundred years of this nation's his-
tory, the central loss-of-citizenship question was expatriation, not de-
nationalization.18 Congress entered the field by enacting the 
Expatriation Act of 1868,19 which sought to protect naturalized U.S. 
citizens who returned to their countries of origin.20 The Act declared: 
Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all 
people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and 1 
the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle 
this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and in-
vested them with the rights of citizenship; and whereas it is claimed that 
such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign 
states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is 
necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign 
allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore, ... any 
15. H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 267-302 (2d ed. 1960). 
16. See generally Dugard, South Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An Exercise in Dena-
tionalization, 10 DEN. J. INTL. L. & POLY. 11 (1980). Other examples include denationalization 
of some two million Russians outside the Soviet Union in 1921, the 1941 Nazi denationalization 
of Jews abroad (including Jews transported out of Germany to concentration camps), and the 
postwar denationalization of more than half a million Koreans who were living in Japan. 
17. For an example of the latter ground, see Nationality Act of 1940, § 40l(e), 54 Stat. 1137 
(1941) (voting in a foreign election), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 2, 92 Stat. 1046 (1978). 
After World War II, several East European countries passed statutes authorizing denationaliza-
tion of citizens living abroad who undertook actions "prejudicial to the national and state inter-
ests." McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 13, at 945. 
18. Expatriation raised two kinds of questions. First, was a U.S. citizen's right to expatriate 
himself absolute, or could it be regulated by Congress (or the states)? This issue arose in several 
cases involving U.S. citizens who purported to expatriate themselves in order to join in a conflict 
between two foreign nations without violating U.S. law requiring citizens to remain neutral. See, 
e.g., Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). Second, what was the status of a naturalized 
U.S. citizen who returned to his country of origin? The position of the United States was that 
such a person had fully expatriated himself and owed no obligation to his country of origin. 
19. Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868). 
20. The immediate stimulus for the statute was British treatment of naturalized U.S. citizens 
in Ireland who participated in anti-British activities. 
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declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this 
government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of ex-
patriation, is declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of 
this government.2 1 
Nothing on the face of the statute restricted its application to natu-
ralized U.S. citizens, and executive branch interpretations quickly 
made clear that it could be invoked by U.S. citizens who sought to 
relinquish American citizenship.22 But recognition of a right of expa-
triation proved to be a double-edged sword for U.S. citizens. Once it 
was firmly established that Americans could cast off their allegiance, it 
left room for the government to argue that certain objective conduct 
evidenced expatriation - such as naturalization elsewhere or resi-
dence of a naturalized citizen in his or her country of origin. The 
expatriation statute of 1868 did not speak to this issue; it simply an-
nounced a right. When, forty years later, Congress next addressed 
loss of citizenship, it adopted the view that objective circumstances 
could establish expatriation. In so doing, it provided for the first time 
for denationalization of U.S. citizens.23 
The 1907 Expatriation Act was primarily aimed at problems occa-
sioned by dual nationality. It provided that a U.S. citizen "shall be 
deemed to have expatriated himself" when he has been naturalized in, 
or taken an oath of allegiance to, a foreign state. The Act also created 
a rebuttable presumption that a naturalized alien who resided for two 
years in his native country "has ceased to be an American citizen." 
Finally, it provided that any American woman who married a for-
eigner "shall take the nationality of her husband" (for so long as the 
marriage lasted). 24 
The Act's focus on dual nationality seems to place the statute in 
the transfer-of-allegiance and divided-allegiance categories. But it also 
had significant "public order" undertones. The stripping of national-
ity was not simply the cutting of ties to a disaffected citizen; it was also 
21. Ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (1868). 
22. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 295 (1873). 
23. Arguably, section 21 of the Enrollment Act of 1865 was the first denationalization stat-
ute. It provided that deserters from military service "shall be deemed and taken to have volunta· 
rily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship." Ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490 (1865). 
However, historian John Roche concludes that the phrase "rights of citizenship" was probably 
intended to refer to the attributes of citizenship (such as the franchise), rather than nationality. 
Roche, The Expatriation Cases: "Breathes There the Man, with Soul so Dead ••• ?, "1963 SUP. 
Cr. REV. 325, 335-36. 
24. Ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Stat. 1288 (1907). This provision was repealed fifteen years later. Act 
of Sept. 22, 1922, Ch. 411, § 7, 42 Stat. 1021, 1022. In 1934, Congress amended the 1907 Act to 
permit any U.S. citizen who married a foreigner to make a formal renunciation of U.S. citizen· 
ship. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 3, 8 Stat. 797. 
The 1907 Act affirmed that there were still limits on the right of expatriation: it prohibited an 
American from expatriating himself during wartime. Ch. 2534, § 2, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907). 
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an attempt to avoid the problems of protection that dual nationals 
caused the United States abroad - problems that threatened to in-
volve the government in foreign controversies. Importantly, the stat-
ute clearly authorized the denationalization of U.S. citizens who had 
no desire to lose American nationality. 
In 1940, Congress added several new grounds for loss of national-
ity.25 Most followed the theory of the earlier statute that certain acts 
could reasonably be understood as indicating a transfer of (or, at least, 
divided) allegiance and that the government had the power to avoid 
such situations. Thus, citizenship was lost by formally renouncing it 
overseas, serving in the armed forces of a foreign state if the person 
also had acquired the nationality of such state, voting in a political 
election of a foreign state, or accepting the duties of an office or em-
ployment under the government of a foreign state for which only na-
tionals of that state were eligible. But the statute also included two 
grounds that appeared to be concerned about something other than 
transferred or divided allegiance: conviction of desertion in time of 
war26 and conviction of treason or attempting to overthrow the U.S. 
government by force. These provisions appear penal in nature, since 
they apply after conviction of a criminal offense. Furthermore, be-
cause they were excepted from the general rule that denationalization 
took effect only after the citizen had taken up residence abroad, they 
permitted the denationalization of citizens who may not have acquired 
citizenship elsewhere. 
Congress subsequently added other penalty-based denationaliza-
tion grounds. A 1944 statute provided for loss of citizenship for per-
sons who departed the United States in time of war to avoid military 
service.27 The Expatriation Act of 1954 authorized denationalization 
for certain convictions under the Smith Act.28 
25. Ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940). 
26. The desertion provision had its roots in the 1865 statute that stripped deserters of "the 
rights of citizenship." See note 23 supra. During consideration of the 1940 legislation, the State 
Department stated that it interpreted the 1865 statute to impose loss of citizenship, not merely 
"the rights" that accompany citizenship. Thus, it viewed the provision in the nationality bill as 
essentially restating existing law. To Revise and Codify the Nationality Law of the United States 
into a Comprehensive Nationality Code: Hearing on H.R. 6127 superseded by H.R. 9980 before 
the House Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 132-33 (1940) (state-
ment of Richard W. Flournoy, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of State). 
27. Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, 58 Stat. 746. 
28. Ch. 1256, § 2, 68 Stat. 1146 (1954). Minor changes were also made by the massive Immi-
gration Act of 1952, including amending the provision relating to employment in a foreign gov-
ernment so that it reads as it does today. 
Other denationalization proposals were not enacted. See, e.g., Expatriation of Certain Na-
tionals of the United States: Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturali-
zation, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) (concerning bills aimed at denationalizing U.S. citizens of 
Japanese ancestry indicating loyalty to the Emperor of Japan). 
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It is possible to see all of the statutory grounds for loss of citizen-
ship as falling within the allegiance category.29 Even so, the most re-
cent statutes evidence greater concern with lack of allegiance than 
with transfer of, or divided, allegiance. But perhaps more accurately, 
the later-added grounds ought to be seen in punishment30 or public 
order terms. Moving away from transferred or divided allegiance 
grounds for denationalization is doubly significant: it means that citi-
zenship may be terminated against the will of the citizen, and it raises 
the possibility of statelessness. 
III. THE JUDICIAL REsPONSE 
The Supreme Court had little difficulty sustaining the early dena-
tionalization statutes. In Mackenzie v. Hare, 31 it upheld the provision 
of the 1907 statute that denationalized an American woman (a lifelong 
resident of California) who had married a British citizen. Four de-
cades later, in Perez v. Brownell, 32 the Court rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the section of the 1940 Act that denationalized a U.S. 
citizen for voting in a foreign election. 
Both cases may be read as recognizing power in the government to 
sort out divided allegiances. Mrs. Mackenzie's marriage was assumed 
to give rise to conflicting loyalties because of the "ancient principle" of 
the "identity of husband and wife."33 And Justice Frankfurter, writ-
ing for the Court in Perez, stated: "Congress has interpreted [voting in 
a foreign election], not irrationally, as importing not only something 
less than complete and unswerving allegiance to the United States but 
also elements of an allegiance to another country in some measure, at 
least, inconsistent with American citizenship. "34 
But more important in each case was the public order justification 
29. For example, the Senate Report on the 1954 legislation stated that "the advocating of the 
overthrow, or the joining in a conspiracy to overthrow, the Government of the United States 
through the activities of the Communist Party and its membership is tantamount to the transfer 
of allegiance to the foreign power which directs such activities of the Communist Party." S. Rep. 
No. 2198, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1954). 
30. See Roche, supra note 23, at 333-37; Note, The Expatriation Act of 1954, 64 YALE L.J. 
1164, 1178-83 (1955); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 163-86 (1963). 
31. 239 U.S. 299 (1915). 
32. 356 U.S. 44 (1958). 
33. Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 311. 
34. 356 U.S. at 60-61. It is significant that both cases permitted the government to determine 
when conflicts of allegiance exist. That the citizens neither felt a conflict nor desired to relin-
quish U.S. citizenship was immaterial. In Mackenzie, the Court avoided the plaintiff's objection 
to involuntary denationalization by finding that she had entered into the marriage voluntarily 
"with notice of the consequences." 239 U.S. at 312. Justice Frankfurter, in Perez, was more 
straightforward. He properly read Mackenzie as "reject[ing] ... the notion that the power of 
Congress to terminate citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent." 356 U.S. at 61. 
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offered by the government. In Mackenzie, the Court found that the 
"marriage of an American woman with a foreigner" may "bring the 
Government into embarrassments and, it may be, into controver-
sies. "35 Similarly, the crucial portions of Justice Frankfurter's opinion 
in Perez are devoted to explaining how "the activities of the citizens of 
one nation when in another country can easily cause serious embar-
rassments to the government of their own country."36 Recognizing 
these public order concerns as legitimate suggests a denationalization 
power far broader than one limited to allegiance grounds. Foreign 
"embarrassments" and "controversies" are not simply the product of 
dual allegiances. Domestic opponents of American foreign policy or 
Americans traveling overseas might equally embroil the United States 
in international disputes. Could Congress denationalize anyone who 
interfered with the pursuit of American foreign policy?37 The stan-
dard adopted by Justice Frankfurter in Perez left room for a broad 
power indeed: "the means - ... withdrawal of citizenship - must be 
reasonably related to the end - here, regulation of foreign a:ffairs."38 
Applying this test, Frankfurter held that Congress could reasonably 
believe that the problems occasioned by citizens voting in foreign elec-
tions "might well become acute, to the point of jeopardizing the suc-
cessful conduct of international relations."39 Denationalization was 
an appropriate remedy because "[t]he termination of citizenship termi-
nates the problem."40 There is nothing in this analysis that turns on 
the allegiance of the overseas voter. 
To the extent Perez permitted denationalization in cases other than 
those involving transferred or divided allegiances, it raised the specter 
of involuntary statelessness.41 It was this concern - the possibility of 
a "man without a country" - that lay at the core of Chief Justice 
Warren's dissent.42 Warren's opinion, joined by Justices Black and 
35. 239 U.S. at 312. 
36. 356 U.S. at 59. 
37. Perez, 356 U.S. at 81-82 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
38. 356 U.S. at 58. Frankfurter concluded that the fourteenth amendment placed no limit on 
Congress' denationalization power. 356 U.S. at 58 n.3. 
39. 356 U.S. at 59. 
40. 356 U.S. at 60. 
41. Indeed the denationalization in Perez apparently occasioned statelessness. While Perez 
had voted in a Mexican election, nothing in the record showed that he had ever acquired Mexi-
can citizenship. See Brief for Petitioner at 14-15, Perez (stating that Perez had not taken on 
citizenship elsewhere). 
42. Statelessness was a problem of significant international concern in the 1950s. Under the 
auspices of the United Na!ions Economic and Social Council, an international convention on the 
status of stateless persons was drafted and opened for signature in 1954. See P. WEIS, NATION-
ALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1979). In 1951, Hannah Arendt's 
The Origins of Totalitarianism was published, which included a powerful and depressing chapter 
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Douglas, did more than simply seek to limit Congress' denationaliza-
tion power to situations involving dual nationality. It rejected out-
right any power in the government to denationalize without the 
citizen's consent: 
Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to 
have rights. Remove this priceless possession and there remains a state-
less person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. He 
has no lawful claim to protection from any nation, and no nation may 
assert rights on his behalf. His very existence is at the sufferance of the 
state within whose borders he happens to be. In this country the expatri-
ate would presumably enjoy, at most, only the limited rights and privi-
leges of aliens, and like the alien he might even be subject to deportation 
and thereby deprived of the right to assert any rights. This government 
was not established with power to decree this fate.43 
According to Warren, this understanding of citizenship was implicit in 
the structure of the American polity: "This Government was born of 
its citizens, it maintains itself in a continuing relationship with them, 
and, in my judgment, it is without power to sever the relationship that 
gives rise to its existence."44 Protection against denationalization was 
also explicitly secured by the first section of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside."45 Warren believed that 
his view undermined neither the earlier federal statutes nor cases such 
as Mackenzie. These could properly be understood in expatriation 
terms: "[C]onduct of a citizen showing a voluntary transfer of alle-
giance is an abandonment of citizenship. "46 
Warren's view that the Constitution denied Congress power to de-
nationalize did not prevail for some time. In the intervening years the 
Court relied on other theories for invalidating denationalization provi-
sions. On the day that Perez was announced, the Court, in Trop v. 
on the twentieth century phenomenon of mass denationalizations. Loss of nationality, according 
to Arendt, left men and women hopelessly vulnerable: "The Rights of Man, supposedly inaliena· 
ble, proved to be unenforceable ... whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any 
sovereign state." H. ARENDT, supra note 15, at 293. She concluded: 
Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of a community willing and able to guaran· 
tee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen ever-increasing numbers 
of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential 
quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of polity itself expels him from humanity. 
Id. at 297. 
There is little doubt that the Court was aware of Arendt's work: it was prominently cited in 
an important law review Note which was cited by Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Perez, 356 
U.S. at 64 n.4 (citing Note, supra note 30). 
43. 356 U.S. at 64-65 (footnotes omitted). 
44. 356 U.S. at 64. 
45. 356 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
46. 356 U.S. at 68. 
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Dulles, 47 struck down a section of the 1940 Act that provided for the 
denationalization of U.S. citizens who had been convicted by court-
martial of "deserting the military ... in time of war." There was no 
majority opinion in Trop. Three Justices joined Chief Justice Warren's 
opinion, which reiterated his view expressed in Perez that citizenship 
could only be lost through voluntary relinquishment.48 Recognizing 
that a majority of the Court had not accepted his assertion in Perez 
that Congress lacked power to denationalize, Warren included an ad-
ditional reason why the statutory provision was invalid: denationali-
zation, under the facts of the case, constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment forbidden by the eighth amendment because it rendered 
the expatriate stateless. Repeating a phrase from his opinion in Perez, 
Warren described denationalization as deprivation of "the right to 
have rights."49 (Justice Brennan provided a fifth vote for invalidation 
of the provision, concluding that the government had not demon-
strated "the requisite rational relation" between expatriation of desert-
ers and the "successful waging of war."50) 
Obvious problems beset the view that denationalization constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment - not the least of which was that de-
sertion was a capital offense. Thus the Court adopted different 
approaches in subsequent cases. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 51 in-
validated the denationalization ground added in 1944 that applied to 
persons who had left the United States to avoid military service. The 
Court maintained the view that loss of nationality constituted punish-
ment, but it shifted from a substantive objection to a procedural one: 
such punishment could not be imposed without the constitutional safe-
guards that normally attend criminal trials. 52 In Schneider v. Rusk, 53 
the Court struck down a provision that denationalized naturalized 
aliens who returned to their native countries and resided there for 
three years. In a terse and muddled opinion, Justice Douglas con-
cluded that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated against natu-
ralized citizens. 
The true victory for the dissenters in Perez came in Afroyim v. 
47. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
48. "Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior .... And the deprivation of 
citizenship is not a weapon that the Government may use to express its displeasure at a citizen's 
conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may be." 356 U.S. at 92-93 (Warren, C.J., plurality 
opinion). 
49. 356 U.S. at 102. 
50. 356 U.S. at 107, 114. 
51. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
52. 372 U.S. at 167. 
53. 377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
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Rusk s4 After a reign of less than a decade, Perez was expressly over-
ruled. ss Afroyim involved a naturalized U.S. citizen who had moved 
to Israel and voted in an Israeli legislative election. The State Depart-
ment thereafter refused to renew his American passport on the ground 
that he had lost his citizenship under the provision of the 1940 Nation-
ality Act sustained in Perez. s6 
Justice Black, writing for the majority, reviewed the history of 
expatriation in the United States at length, but in the end relied pri-
marily on "the language and the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."s7 The crux of the opinion is a remarkably short and confusing 
paragraph: 
Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress de-
cides to do so under the name of one of its general or implied grants of 
power. In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left 
without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world - as a 
man without a country. Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a coopera-
tive affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its citizenry. 
The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous 
to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporarily in 
office can deprive another group of citizens of their citizenship. We hold 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect 
every citizen of this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction 
of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or race.ss 
There are a number of different ideas in this paragraph that arguably 
are derived from different premises (which remain undisclosed) and 
may well point in different directions. Some of these will be pursued 
below. What is most important is what Justice Black thought it all 
added up to: "Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen 
that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a 
free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship."S9 
An early decision of the Burger Court led some to believe that 
Afroyim would be short-lived.60 But the Court's decision in Vance v. 
54. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). 
55. This quick shift was due in part to a personnel change (Fortas took the seat Frankfurter 
had occupied and voted with the majority in Afroyim) and to Justice Brennan's change in view 
(he joined the majority opinions in both Perez and Afroyim ). These circumstances offset the fact 
that Justice Whittaker, who had dissented in Perez, had been replaced by Justice White, who 
dissented in Afroyim. 
56. 387 U.S. at 254. 
57. 387 U.S. at 267. 
58. 387 U.S. at 267-68. 
59. 387 U.S. at 268. 
60. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (upholding a statute requiring a U.S. citizen born 
abroad to come to the United States before the age of23 and to reside in the United States for five 
years between the ages of 14 and 28 in order to maintain citizenship; Afroyim distinguished as 
involving a citizen naturalized in the United States and therefore protected by the fourteenth 
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Terrazas in 1980 reaffirmed the central message of Afroyim that loss of 
citizenship could not occur without proof by the government that an 
"expatriating act was accompanied by an intent to terminate United 
States citizenship."61 
In sum, the Court's initial willingness to sustain denationalization 
statutes gave way in the 1960s to a virtual prohibition on government 
power to terminate citizenship unilaterally. The Court's shift was ap-
parently based on pragmatic grounds. Alarmed ,by the eagerness with 
which Congress had expanded the grounds for denationalization in the 
1940s and 1950s, faced with statutes that stripped citizenship on 
grounds other than sorting out allegiances, concerned about the use of 
denationalization as a form of punishment, and cognizant of the harms 
that involuntary statelessness imposed, the Court adopted a prophy-
lactic rule strongly protective of the individual. This development 
paralleled the Warren Court's protection of other interests it deemed 
fundamental. As in Miranda v. Arizona 62 and the reapportionment 
cases, 63 a broad rule was adopted to secure important rights and pre-
vent serious harm to individuals in the face of perceived governmental 
abuse. 
The Warren Court doctrine effectively ruled out denationalization 
on public order or punishment grounds and defined permissible alle-
giance-based grounds quite narrowly. Furthermore, it adopted an in-
tent-to-relinquish test as the measure of transferred allegiance. The 
safest way to know whether allegiance had lapsed, the Court seems to 
have reasoned, was to leave it to the citizen to say so. 64 In short, the 
Court collapsed denationalization into expatriation. 
In the Kahane case, the State Department is not asking for a return 
to Perez, which arguably would support public order grounds of dena-
tionalization. Rather, it is seeking to make more coherent the under-
standing of denationalization in allegiance terms. From the allegiance 
perspective, the intent-to-relinquish test is overinclusive because it 
protects people who wish to maintain American citizenship for rea-
sons other than fidelity to the United States. Thus, the Department is 
amendment). Congress repealed the statutory provision upheld in Bellei in 1978. Act of Oct. 10, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, § 1, 92 Stat. 1046. 
61. 444 U.S. 252, 263 (1980). 
62. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
63. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
64. Warren's opinion in Perez has been read as hinting at some power in the government to 
define instances of transferred allegiance, perhaps against the will of the citizen: "[U]nder some 
circumstances [a citizen] may be found to have abandoned his status by voluntarily performing 
acts that compromise his undivided allegiance to his country." 356 U.S. at 78. But the Court 
expressly rejected this interpretation in Terrazas. 444 U.S. at 260·61. 
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arguing for a test of allegiance that asks a decisionmaker to determine 
where an individual's true allegiance lies. The Board of Appellate Re-
view's decision in Kahane accepted the Department's invitation. While 
the opinion is couched in Afroyim's terms (arguing that Kahane's ac-
tivities are better indications of his intent to relinquish citizenship than 
his "self-serving" statements), it in fact applied an allegiance test. 
The remainder of this essay will search for the theoretical under-
pinnings of the rule of Afroyim and evaluate the State Department's 
attempt to modify the doctrine of the Warren Court. 
IV. PERSPECTIVES ON Loss OF CITIZENSHIP 
Is there a theory - an understanding of citizenship implicit in our 
constitutional system - that supports the current doctrine? Chief 
Justice Warren's dissent in Perez and Justice Black's majority opinion 
in Afroyim suggest several views of citizenship worth exploring. 
A. The Rights Perspective 
In Perez, Warren describes citizenship as "the right to have 
rights." Black's majority opinion in Afroyim finds "a constitutional 
right to remain a citizen" of the United States. Understanding citizen-
ship in "rights" terms, at first glance, appears quite reasonable. Citi-
zenship is of fundamental importance to an individual, and its loss can 
impose substantial harms. It is a status people are willing to make 
great sacrifices to obtain and defend. 65 In modem constitutional dis-
course, calling citizenship a "right" gives it weight; it shifts the burden 
to the government to come forward with compelling reasons for its 
actions that abridge or deny citizenship. 66 
Seeing citizenship as a right also provides a basis for the intent-to-
relinquish test and the asymmetry of current loss-of-nationality law -
that the citizen may expatriate himself (within some narrow excep-
tions), but Congress may not take citizenship away. Our usual under-
standing is that while the state may not normally abridge 
constitutional rights, the individual may waive them. In this light, ex-
patriation is not a right in and of itself; rather, it is the waiver of the 
right to citizenship. 67 Thus the rights perspective seems to have sub-
65. [I]t is safe to assert that nowhere in the world today is the right of citizenship of 
greater worth to an individual than it is in this country. It would be difficult to exaggerate 
its value and importance. By many it is regarded as the highest hope of civilized men. 
Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943). 
66. See Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REV. 977, 999-1003 (1986); 
cf R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 188-92 (1977). 
67. If expatriation is viewed as a waiver of a right, then Congress may have some power to 
impose limits on expatriation. The Supreme Court, in other circumstances, has made clear that 
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stantial explanatory power. Unfortunately, major difficulties beset a 
"rights" understanding of citizenship. 
From where might such a "right to citizenship" derive? The Court 
in Afroyim points to the fourteenth amendment. But the message from 
the fourteenth amendment is hardly clear. The amendment does not 
speak in "rights" terms; nor does it purport to limit governmental 
power regarding acquisition or loss of citizenship. The citizenship 
clause was primarily intended to disavow Justice Taney's conclusion 
in Dred Scott that black Americans were not citizens. 68 Thus it is not 
surprising that the amendment reads like a definition. To be sure, cer-
tain rights may flow from holding the status of "citizen." But that 
does not make citizenship itself a "right." To see this, imagine that 
the Constitution were amended to define "person" - perhaps in re-
sponse to the abortion debate. Although we might then talk about the 
rights that such constitutionally defined persons would have (such as 
the right not to lose one's life without due process), we would not talk 
about "personhood" as a right. 69 
If the fourteenth amendment does not do much to establish an ir-
revocable right to citizenship, perhaps the importance of the interest 
argues for such a result. The claim would be that citizenship is a "fun-
damental right" protected by a substantive reading of the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause70 or, perhaps, implicit in the structure of the 
American constitutional system. 11 
The denationalization cases may be exercises in substantive due 
process, but they do not read that way. Typically, in a substantive due 
process case, the Court will define the individual interest at stake and 
then examine the nature and strength of competing government inter-
ests. But in the denationalization cases there is no careful balancing, 
no discussion of less burdensome alternatives. It is as if the Court 
possession of a right does not entail an automatic right to waive it. See Gannett Co. v. De 
Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (right to public trial); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965) 
(right to jury trial). Accordingly, it would not do violence to the rights perspective to recognize 
congressional limits on expatriation - perhaps in wartime (the 1907 Act contained such a provi-
sion), or to prevent avoidance of obligations owed the state. Cf Di Portanova v. United States, 
690 F.2d 169 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (refusing to recognize, under the federal tax laws, purported expatri-
ation that would have reduced individual's tax liability). In fact, U.S. law currently restricts the 
expatriation of individuals. INA § 35l(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1483(a) (1982). 
68. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676 (1898). 
69. Furthermore, as Justice Harlan noted in his dissent inAfroyim, 387 U.S. at 279-80, Con-
gress approved a bill - just two years before it passed the fourteenth amendment - that would 
have denationalized rebel office holders. (The bill did not become law because Lincoln failed to 
sign it before Congress adjourned.) Such action is evidence that the fourteenth amendment was 
not seen by its adopters as depriving the government of the power to denationalize. 
70. Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
71. See c. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). 
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viewed citizenship as some kind of "super-right" - one that cannot be 
balanced away. This seems to be what Chief Justice Warren was driv-
ing at when he described citizenship as "the right to have rights."72 
But Warren's characterization is a dramatic overstatement of the 
importance of citizenship in the United States today.73 Aliens residing 
in the United States - even illegal aliens - are protected by the Con-
stitution. They are entitled to nearly all the public and private oppor-
tunities and benefits afforded citizens.74 The deportation of aliens is 
significantly constrained by the fifth amendment's due process clause. 
A central benefit of citizenship in other countries - the ability to 
transmit citizenship to one's children - is far less important in the 
United States because, by virtue of the fourteenth amendment, chil-
dren born to aliens in this country are automatically American citi-
zens. Citizenship, of course, does carry with it certain benefits, 
including the ability to travel on a U.S. passport, to claim protection 
by the U.S. government overseas, and the right to vote and hold office. 
But it is far more accurate to adopt the characterization of citizenship 
employed by the Court in recent equal protection cases - as member-
ship in the political community entitling a person to exercise part of 
the sovereign power of the nation75 - than to describe it as the "right 
to have rights." It is primarily residence in the United States, not citi-
zenship, that affords rights to individuals. 
One may properly respond that denationalization threatens resi-
dence in the United States as well. This is possible when grounds for 
denationalization of citizens are also grounds for deportation of aliens. 
For example, a citizen convicted of conspiring to overthrow the 
United States government may be denationalized;76 after loss of citi-
zenship, the person (now an alien) is deportable under several provi-
sions of the immigration laws. 77 Perhaps in this derivative fashion, 
there is some truth to Warren's claim that one's ability to enjoy consti-
tutional rights in the United States is secure only if one is a citizen. 
72. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion). Similarly, 
Justice Douglas, dissenting in Perez, asserted: "Citizenship, like freedom of speech, press, and 
religion, occupies a preferred position in our written Constitution, because it is a grant absolute 
in terms. The power of Congress to withhold it, modify it, or cancel it does not exist." 356 U.S. 
at 84. 
73. See generally A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33-54 (1975). 
74. This is so, as a constitutional matter, for the states. While weaker constitutional limits 
are imposed on the federal government, Congress has excluded permanent resident aliens from 
few federal programs. Perhaps the severest current disabilities are lack of the franchise and 
ineligibility for the federal civil service. 
75. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982). 
76. INA § 349(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 148l(a)(7) (1982). 
77. INA § 24l(a)(6), (7), 8 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(6), (7) (1982). 
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But I would urge caution in reaching this conclusion for several 
reasons. First, the Court's fear that denationalization can create 
"rightless" people is in large part due to its own unwillingness to im-
pose any substantive limits on Congress' power to deport aliens. 78 
There is something quite peculiar about our constitutional doctrine 
here. Although permanent resident aliens are entitled to nearly all the 
rights and privileges that citizens enjoy, Congress has no power to re-
move citizenship and virtually plenary power to deport aliens. If re-
strictions on loss of citizenship are based on the deprivations 
denationalization entails, then some limits ought to be placed on de-
portation, because it is the removal of the person from the United 
States that occasions the severest injuries. 
Second, aliens are not (yet) deported to outer space or Devil's Is-
land. The United States must find some other country to accept 
them. 79 Deported aliens are at least entitled to the rights the receiving 
country extends to aliens. These may not be many, but they are likely 
to be a far cry from Warren's description of denationalization as "the 
total destruction of the individual's status in organized society."80 
Finally, and most important, denationalization can hardly be said 
to entail loss of the "rights to have rights" when it does not bring 
about statelessness. Many of the denationalization grounds contem-
plate the acquisition or existence of citizenship elsewhere. Dual na-
tionals (Rabbi Kahane, for example) certainly have the right to have 
rights in another polity. Thus while Warren's cataclysmic characteri-
zation might have been true for Perez and Trop, it was hardly apt for 
Afroyim (who could qualify as an Israeli citizen under the Law of 
Return) and Terrazas (who had taken Mexican nationality). 
In sum, Chief Justice Warren may have been correct that denation-
alization sometimes imposes serious, even devastating, harms on indi-
viduals. But moving from this insight to an absolute right of 
citizenship is problematic. 81 Most fundamentally, it seems particu-
larly inappropriate to conceive of citizenship in rights terms at all. 
78. See T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 349-69 
(1985). 
79. Aliens for whom a country of deportation is not located within six months must be re-
leased from detention. INA § 242(c), (d), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c), (d) (1982). 
80. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
81. Nor can any theory of proportionality or balancing get us there either. Perhaps such 
theories can explain why it strikes us as unjust to take away citizenship from someone who fails 
to pay taxes or violates the speed limit. But once we are dealing with conduct that is a capital 
offense, it is hard to see how denationalization can be a disproportionate response. See (oddly 
enough) Warren's opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) ("Since wartime desertion is 
punishable by death, there can be no argument that the penalty of denationalization is excessive 
in relation to the gravity of the crime."). 
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Citizenship is not a right held against the state; it is a relationship with 
the state or, perhaps, a relationship among persons in the state. It is 
membership in a common venture. 82 The notion that membership de-
cisions can turn simply on the will of an individual - and allow no 
role for other members or the group as a whole - ought to strike us as 
odd. 
These considerations suggest that the rights perspective cannot 
provide an adequate account of citizenship and denationalization -
even if it does explain the prevailing doctrine. We must look else-
where for a satisfactory theoretical foundation for our current consti-
tutional principles. 83 
B. The Consent Perspective 
Citizenship is sometimes conceived of as membership in a state 
generated by mutual consent of a person and the state. Consent the-
ory posits a world of mature human beings able to make thoughtful 
choices about with whom, and where, they would like to live. Citizen-
ship, in this view, takes on a special quality because it is the product of 
free, conscious choice, not simply an unplanned event or an accident 
of birth. The act of choosing a certain relationship - for example, a 
spouse - may make the choice and the ensuing relationship far more 
significant than if we find ourselves in it through no will of our own -
say, an arranged marriage. 84 Indeed, two consent theorists, in an im-
portant new book, argue that consensually based citizenship is "more 
likely to generate a genuine sense of community among all citizens 
than the existing scheme [of citizenship determined simply by birth in 
the United States]."85 
82. See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31-63 (1983); Martin, Due Process and Member-
ship in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PIIT. L. REV. 165, 190-208 
(1983). 
83. One might assert that I underestimate the difference between aliens and citizens by failing 
to appreciate the importance of the right to vote and hold elective office. These rights, it may be 
argued, empower a person to contribute to the creation of new rights and the maintenance of 
existing ones. They also give a person potential influence with officials (other than judges) who 
protect and establish rights. There may be, therefore, a strong link between rights of political 
participation (and therefore citizenship) and the enjoyment of other rights. 
While I do not deny these claims, it should be recognized that resident aliens are protected by 
most constitutional guarantees, and they may enforce these rights in court whether or not they 
can vote. Furthermore, under modem equal protection analysis, see, e.g., Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), it is difficult for states to restrict benefits and opportunities to citizens. 
Thus it would be wrong to see political rights as the only guarantee of other rights. 
84. We may also have a need to believe that we have made the right choice, which may lend 
us to defend staunchly that which we have chosen. 
85. P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT 5 (1985). The primary argu-
ment of Professors Schuck and Smith's book is that the children of illegal aliens born in the 
United States should not automatically be deemed American citizens. This is said to follow from 
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Whatever the merits of seeing citizenship in consent terms, 86 it 
cannot explain the current constitutional doctrine regarding denation-
alization. As Professors Schuck and Smith concede, "a thoroughgoing 
commitment to pure consensual membership might seem to imply a 
national power to denationalize citizens at will." In other words, con-
sent is a two-way street with both entrances and exits. 87 If a citizen's 
right to expatriate himself rests upon the significance of mutual con-
sent to the relationship, it is hard to see how the state can be denied 
the same right to withdraw consent through denationalization. Thus 
the consent perspective seems dramatically inconsistent with the 
asymmetry of the right to "de-consent" produced by Afroyim. 88 
It might be argued that the citizen and the state do not consent on 
equal terms. For example, citizenship might be analogized to the 
1 granting of tenure: the institution is virtually prohibited from revok-
ing consent, but the tenured individual remains quite free to leave. 
But this description is not satisfactory. To assert that this asymmetri-
cal situation exists is either a statement about the intent of the parties 
or about external limits on the government's freedom to consent on its 
own terms. The existence of denationalization statutes undercuts the 
first alternative; such laws make clear that the government does not 
enter into an agreement believing it is terminable only by the individ-
ual. The second alternative takes us beyond the consent perspective 
because it posits a constitutional principle that forces the government 
to "consent" in a particular way. If this is so, the consent perspective 
has added nothing; we must still search for an independent constitu-
tional reason - not based on the government's consent - for prohib-
iting denationalization. 
consent theory because the United States has not consented to the presence of illegal aliens and 
therefore has not consented to the citizenship of their children. 
86. While I fundamentally disagree with Professors Schuck and Smith, I will not pursue 
criticism of their work here beyond stating that I do not view birthright citizenship to be "some-
thing of a bastard concept in American ideology." Id. at 2. I see birthright citizenship as a 
concept of impeccable pedigree and of great importance to the American polity. For a trenchant 
critique of Schuck and Smith's book, see Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic? 
(Book Review), 11 YALE J. INTL. L. 278 (1985). 
87. Consensual entry into a relationship does not necessarily imply a right of either party to 
terminate the relationship at will. Marriage laws are the obvious example. Thus, one could 
imagine a version of the consent perspective that supports consensual attainment of citizenship 
followed by perpetual allegiance. This, of course, does not aptly describe American nationality 
rules. 
88. Schuck and Smith seek to avoid this result by arguing that "a power [to denationalize] 
might threaten the vigorous exercise of basic constitutional freedoms, such as First Amendment 
political rights, or might create a condition of involuntary statelessness and thus of acute human 
vulnerability." P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 85, at 125. While I share their fears about 
the exercise of power to denationalize, I fail to see how they can deny such a power under a 
consent theory that includes a right of expatriation. Their conclusion bears the appearance of an 
ad hoc exception that seriously undermines the theory. 
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C. The Contractarian Perspective 
Dissenting in Perez, Chief Justice Warren examined denationaliza-
tion from the perspective of the underlying political philosophy of 
those who founded the nation: 
What is this Government, whose power is here being asserted? And 
what is the source of that power? The answers are the foundation of our 
Republic. To secure the inalienable rights of the individual, "Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed." I do not believe the passage of time has less-
ened the truth of this proposition. It is basic to our form of government. 
This Government was born of its citizens, it maintains itself in a continu-
ing relationship with them, and, in my judgment, it is without power to 
sever the relationship that gives rise to its existence. I cannot believe 
that a government conceived in the spirit of ours was established with 
power to take from the people their most basic right. 89 
One interpretation of Warren's argument is that it is an application of 
contract theory - that is, a perspective that focuses on agreements 
among individuals made in the process of creating a state. (Contract 
theory, as I am using it, looks to agreements among individuals; con-
sent theory looks to agreements between an individual and the state.) 
Contract theory may be a sensible perspective for thinking about 
citizenship and denationalization because membership is a question 
that precedes, or at least accompanies, the formation of a state. Some 
group of human beings must come together to form a government, and 
that group must have some understanding of what constitutes them as 
a group. That notions of membership may exist prior to a constitution 
is evident in Warren's quotation of the Declaration of Independence in 
the paragraph above; he is relying upon the underlying assumptions 
and principles regarding membership that informed the creation of the 
government of the United States.9° 
Contract theory has added attractions for constitutional interpre-
tation. A focus on an original contract provides stability and legiti-
macy to the development of constitutional law. Doctrine is seen not as 
the willful act of judges or other government officials, but as a reflec-
tion of an earlier agreement; at least at some point, it can be argued, 
somebody assented to this exercise of government power.91 Finally, 
89. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958). 
90. See also M. WALZER, supra note 82, at 31 ("[W]hat we do with regard to membership 
structures all our other distributive choices: it determines with whom we make those choices, 
from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, to whom we allocate goods and services."); 
B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 89-95 (1980). 
91. See Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution. 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 376 (1981). For cri-
tiques of "originalist" interpretation, see, for example, Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: 
A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
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contract analysis is a fashionable way to derive and explore principles 
of moral philosophy. To the extent such principles may inform our 
understanding of constitutional rights and legitimate government 
power, contract theory may be a useful method of contemplation.92 
We can take contract theory in two directions. Either we could 
ask what agreement we believe the framers of our social contract -
the Constitution - reached regarding citizenship; or we could investi-
gate the agreement that a hypothetical group of founders, similar to us 
and sharing our basic political philosophy, would reach were they 
asked to address the question. This latter inquiry would support a 
more present-minded approach to our Constitution - one not wedded 
to the "original intent" of the framers, but rather searching for current 
understandings of the fundamental constitutional principles of our 
political community. 
I will not pursue the first line of inquiry here, as it is well-traveled 
ground. 93 It is sufficient to note that the prevailing view at the time of 
the drafting of the Constitution was that citizenship was acquired by 
birth or naturalization and could be lost only with the consent of the 
sovereign.94 As to denationalization, we have little evidence either 
way. 
The second version of contract theory is the more interesting, 
given the difficulties of discerning the framers' intentions about mod-
ern constitutional questions. The project here is to ask: How might a 
hypothetical group of people interested in creating a political commu-
nity construct rules regarding attainment and loss of membership? 
Admittedly, this kind of analysis may produce any number of answers, 
depending on the characteristics and beliefs with which one endows 
the hypothetical founders. Not surprisingly, lawyers playing this 
game in the early days of the Republic were able to argue that contract 
theory supported both sides of the question on the right of expatria-
92. Professor David Richards has used John Rawls' notion of the original position to derive 
principles of constitutional law. See, e.g., Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional 
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS 
L.J. 957 (1979). 
93. For detailed analyses, see J. KETINER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZEN-
SHIP, 1608-1870 (1978); P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 85; I. TSIANG, THE QUESTION OF 
EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907 (1942); Borchard, Decadence of the American Doc-
trine of Voluntary Expatriation, 25 AM. J. INTL. L. 312 (1931); Duvall, Expatriation Under 
United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 
VA. L. REV. 408 (1970); Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate 
American Citizens, 53 GEO. L.J. 315 (1965); Morrow, The Early American Attitude Toward the 
Doctrine of Expatriation, 26 AM. J. INTL. L. 552 (1932); Roche, supra note 23. 
94. Several important issues, of course, remained highly uncertain - such as the status of 
Indians, slaves, and free blacks. It took a civil war and the fourteenth amendment to provide 
some of the answers. See generally J. KETINER, supra note 93. 
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tion.95 With this caveat, let me explore the manner in which a set of 
founders, living in the present, might talk about loss of citizenship. 
First, it seems reasonable that those creating a nation would seek 
to ensure that they will be counted as members once the state comes 
into being. It is further likely that they will want their children to be 
members as well. Thus, I will assume that there will be agreement 
that the children of citizens will be citizens. No doubt the state will 
want some mechanism for making new members - that is, some kind 
of naturalization law. It is conceivable that the founders might wish 
to restrict the rights of naturalized citizens, including their ability to 
transmit citizenship to their children. But, endowing these founders 
with modern notions of equality and concerns about "second-class cit-
izenship,"96 I will posit that they would treat native-born and natural-
ized citizens alike. 97 
The notion of citizenship by birth and naturalization does not en-
tail perpetual allegiance. It seems sensible that the founders would not 
want to force a person to remain within the state against his will - at 
least, absent a claim that the person ought to be punished or owes a 
debt that ought to be repaid. Recognition of some kind of right of 
expatriation is therefore likely.98 
· The denationalization question, however, is not easily resolved in 
this thought experiment. One can imagine arguments against a broad 
power to denationalize that might be persuasive to the founders. If 
denationalization were viewed merely as an exercise of ordinary poli-
tics, majorities could tyrannize minorities by threatening them with 
loss of citizenship. Or, less perniciously, denationalization could be 
seen as a convenient means of achieving domestic or foreign policy 
objectives. Simple self-interest coupled with the recognition that they 
might not always find themselves in the majority ought to lead (rea-
sonably risk-averse) founders to be concerned about malicious or cas-
ual resort to a denationalization power. 
Perhaps these considerations would produce agreement that dena-
95. Compare the arguments of counsel in Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 139 (1795) 
(right of expatriation "is implied ... in the nature and object of the social compact"), with Chief 
Justice Ellsworth's charge to the jury in Williams' Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) 
(No. 17,708) (contract theory entails that "members cannot dissolve [the] compact, without the 
consent or default of the community"). 
96. Cf. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
97. But see Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971). 
98. The United States formally recognized such a right by passing the Expatriation Act of 
1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223. But see P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 85, at 87-88 (noting that 
some constraints on expatriation were thought reasonable even after the 1868 Act); INA 
§ 349(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6) (1982) (renunciation of American citizenship in the United 
States permitted only in wartime and with approval of the Attorney General). 
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tionalization on "public order grounds" should be prohibited - or, at 
least, not permitted without a very strong justification by the state.99 
But is there any reason to believe that the hypothetical contractors 
would not allow denationalization for at least some of the allegiance 
categories? They might well conclude that, if a person shows himself 
to be fundamentally opposed to the core principles of the society, he 
has surrendered any right he has to remain within it. Excommunica-
tion, of course, is an old tradition. Furthermore, the founders could 
well wish that members be willing to undertake obligations necessary 
for the survival (or smooth functioning?) of the state. Anyone who 
does not undertake such obligations, they might believe, ought not to 
be able to claim the benefits of living in their state. These arguments 
might support a denationalization power for citizens demonstrating a 
lack of allegiance - as evidenced, perhaps, by treason, armed insur-
rection, espionage on behalf of a foreign power, draft evasion, and de-
sertion. Similarly, it is not clear why the contractors would protect 
the continued membership of citizens who have transferred or divided 
their allegiance. Abandonment and adultery are traditional grounds 
for terminating marriages. 
If this discussion presents a plausible draft of a founding contract, 
then we have gone far beyond the rule of Afroyim that citizenship may 
be lost only when a citizen intends to relinquish it. Accordingly, I find 
little in either version of contract analysis to support Chief Justice 
Warren's claim that "a government conceived in the spirit of ours was 
[not] established with power to take from the people their most basic 
right."100 There may well be some limits on the denationalization 
power. But the notion of citizenship absolutely unrevokable by the 
state does not seem to follow from contract theory. 
99. Nor is it likely that the hypothetical framers would authorize denationalization on "pun-
ishment" grounds - at least not for most offenses. Principles of proportionality and rehabilita-
tion ought to be given substantial weight. As a rule, this society has asked people to "pay their 
debt" to society and then return. Congress has never passed a law authorizing the deportation of 
citizens. Of course, the denationalization laws of the 1940s and 1950s may be cited as strong 
evidence for the view that this society tolerates denationalization as punishment. But both the 
historical context of the statutes and the fact that most were struck down by the Supreme Court 
suggest that such laws are not the best evidence of fundamental societal principles. 
100. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958). It might be argued that, in the quoted re-
mark, Warren is not referring to contract theory at all. Rather, he is appealing to the fundamen-
tal (even if long forgotten) constitutional principle that the federal government is a government 
of delegated powers. Where, Warren might be asking, does the Constitution give Congress the 
power to denationalize? Of course, under modem constitutional law there is no problem with 
this question: all denationalization grounds may be explained with a straight face as necessary 
and proper to the execution of a delegated or well-established implied power. See, e.g., Kennedy 
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 212 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (war power); Perez v. 
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (foreign affairs power). 
1494 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1471 
D. The Communitarian Perspective 
"Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair," wrote 
Justice Black in Afroyim. "Its citizenry is the country and the country 
is its citizenry."101 This may appear to be a vacuous tautology, or 
even a frightening appeal to some notion of a "fatherland." But it may 
also be read as an appeal to a communitarian perspective on 
citizenship. 
Communitarianism is a hazy term used to describe any number of 
different political theories, which may range from conservative 
Burkean notions to radical left conceptions of the state. Several ideas, 
however, that seem central to most accounts, are relevant to an under-
standing of citizenship. Communitarian theory begins with individu-
als situated in a real society, not in a hypothetical state of nature or on 
the brink of contract. The individual is seen as an "encumbered" 
self. 102 He is defined - or constituted - in part by his relationships, 
roles, and allegiances. His relationship with the state is based on his 
identification with and immersion in the society's history, traditions, 
and core assumptions and purposes. If the bywords of liberal theory 
are freedom, choice, and consent, the bywords of communitarian the-
ory are solidarity, responsibility, and civic virtue. The operative meta-
phors for the state are "family," "community," or "a people." From 
the communitarian perspective, citizenship is seen as an organic rela-
tionship between the citizen and the state. 
The claim here is not that either the Constitution or American so-
ciety is communitarian (however we choose to define that term). 
Rather, I am suggesting that thinking about membership from a com-
munitarian perspective may shed some light on our current under-
standings of citizenship. Thus the analysis that follows is not 
necessarily one to which a committed communitarian living in a com-
munitarian society would subscribe. The project here is to examine 
the underpinnings of doctrine in our liberal democratic constitutional 
system. 
The communitarian perspective is grounded in the fourteenth 
amendment's citizenship clause. The vast majority of American citi-
zens attain citizenship by birth, not by choice or consent. By the time 
most Americans are old enough to understand the concepts of loyalty 
or allegiance, they have already developed a conception of self that 
incorporates American citizenship. Of course nationality may be cast 
101. 387 U.S. at 268. 
102. I borrow this term from Michael Sandel. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the 
Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81 (1984). 
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off, just as one's family or religion may be abandoned. But for the 
most part, we live our lives within the identifications into which we are 
born. Change of nationality, like conversion, is a noteworthy occur-
rence. Indeed, no more than one thousand U.S. citizens expatriate 
themselves each year. 103 Modem consent theorists may view birth-
right citizenship as "something of a bastard concept in American ide-
ology," 104 but to most of us, birthright citizenship is simply a 
recognition that human beings are constituted by, and constitutive of, 
the society in which they are raised.1os 
Viewing citizenship in communitarian terms brings to light two 
considerations that support limits on denationalization. The first de-
rives from the description of the harm that denationalization may im-
pose on individuals. As previously discussed, the rights perspective 
has improperly characterized that harm as loss of "the right to have 
rights." The communitarian perspective sees the harm differently: 
Denationalization may grossly intrude upon a person's conception of 
self. It is akin to forced conversion. When the state strips an individ-
ual of her citizenship, it may well be tearing the self apart. 106 
This may sound like an overstatement, but test the proposition in 
your mind. Imagine that you awake one morning to find that your 
American citizenship has been taken away. What springs to mind? 
That travel to Europe may be difficult without an American passport? 
That no country will seek your release if you become a hostage over-
seas? That it will be impossible to vote in the next presidential elec-
tion? I doubt that any of these issues are on the top of your concern 
103. Letter to the author from George M. Scanlon, United States Department of State (Nov. 
21, 1985) (transmitting loss of nationality statistics for fiscal years 1983-1985) (on file at Michi-
gan Law Review); see also 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATU-
RALIZATION SERVICE 177. 
104. P. SCHUCK & R. SMITH, supra note 85, at 2. 
105. Compare Michael Sandel's attack on the liberal view of the "unencumbered self": 
Can we view ourselves as independent selves, independent in the sense that our identity is 
never tied to our aims and attachments? 
I do not think we can, at least not without cost to those loyalties and convictions whose 
moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding 
ourselves as the particular persons we are - as members of this family or community or 
nation or people, as bearers of that history, as citizens of this republic. Allegiances such as 
these ... go beyond the obligations I voluntarily incur and the "natural duties" I owe to 
human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even 
permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those more or less 
enduring attachments and commitments that, taken together, partly define the person I am. 
Sandel, supra note 102, at 90. 
106. To the extent "the country is its citizenry," Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268, the state may also 
be tearing itself apart when it denationalizes. Denying a state the power to cast off its constituent 
parts may be likened to prohibiting a person from dismembering himself. I recognize, however, 
that metaphors may be invoked on both sides: perhaps denationalization is the removal of a 
malignant cancer - a constituent part gone mad that threatens the health of the body politic. 
See text at notes 109-11 infra. 
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list. More likely, you feel violated, naked. You ask, how can I be not 
an American? What am I, then? A part of oneself is gone. 
A second argument against denationalization from the communi-
tarian perspective flows from the state's responsibility for the individu-
als it has helped to constitute. An analogy to the family may help 
here. Leaving legal obligations aside, it seems common moral ground 
that parents are responsible for the care, security, and education of 
their children. Children, after all, do not choose to be brought into the 
world; they exist because of the choices (or at least the acts) of others. 
Much of who the children are is a product of the parents' choices. A 
child's moral, political, and religious beliefs, notions of responsibility 
and the good - at least until the child reaches maturity - are primar-
ily based on the lessons, either intended or unintended, of the family. 
I believe that these considerations create a strong basis for a moral 
principle that parents may not throw a child out or tum him away 
(even though the child may be free to walk away). Parents are deemed 
responsible for their children in both senses of that word: they have 
made the children who they are and they must take responsibility for 
their creations. 
While the leap from family to state is not unproblematic, I think 
the analogy is permissible here. The state has helped to endow the 
citizen with a set of values and relationships that precede any con-
scious choice by the citizen (at least a citizen at birth). In much the 
same way that the parent is responsible for the child, so the state is 
responsible for the citizen.107 Under this reasoning the state - like 
the family - could punish, but it could not banish. •08 
Understanding citizenship from a communitarian perspective thus 
lends support to the Court's results in the loss-of-citizenship cases. It 
provides a basis for a strong presumption against a power to denation-
107. I do not mean to suggest a totally deterministic position - one that might, for example, 
hold society entirely responsible for the acts of individuals. The argument is not that society 
"should be blamed" for what person X does to person Y. Rather, it is that the state may not 
abandon a person for whom it is responsible simply because the state deems it convenient to do 
so. 
108. As stated before, I am not suggesting that the United States is organized on communi-
tarian principles. A communitarian society may have additional reasons for disfavoring dena-
tionalization. Communitarianism ought to seek ways of fostering dedication to communal 
projects. To do so, it needs to encourage conversation among differing views to work toward 
some kind of common ground. Threatening the expulsion of dissenters seems unlikely to gener-
ate genuine commitment to the polity and its aspirations. Furthermore, egregious misconduct on 
the part of some members of society ought to be understood as a signal to the state that some-
thing is seriously wrong in the body politic. Allowing the state to denationalize at wilt permits it 
too easily to avoid the problems it ought to be addressing. These arguments may carry less 
weight in a liberal society. 
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alize. But it is doubtful that communitarian analysis takes us as far as 
the intent-to-relinquish test of Afroyim and Terrazas. 
Why, from the communitarian perspective, must a state tolerate 
the continued membership of a disloyal citizen - a person who has 
made clear that he has no commitment to (or outright disdain for) the 
society's core principles? The analogy of family responsibility can take 
us only so far. At some point, a child grows up and assumes responsi-
bility for his actions. To be sure, his views and conduct will be heavily 
influenced by the family milieu from which he came. But if, as a ma-
ture adult, he condemns the family's mores and announces that he 
feels no responsibility toward family members or goals, it hardly seems 
immoral for the family to state that the ties that bound have been 
severed. Disinheritance may be harsh, but it isn't always unjust. 109 
Furthermore, where the citizen has, in effect, declared war on soci-
ety, the claim that denationalization destroys one's concept of self is 
much less persuasive.110 The citizen's actions may be the best signal 
that the individual's conception of self does not include attachment to 
the core principles of society. In such a case, denationalization may 
simply ratify an unfortunate social fact; it would not sever the self. 
Thus, denationalization could be a justifiable response to treason or 
subversion, and perhaps even to desertion in wartime. 
This reasoning would also tolerate denationalization in the case of 
transferred loyalty. The denationalized individual may lose the bene-
fits of United States citizenship, but there should be little or no harm 
to the person's conception of self. Nor need the society feel responsi-
bility for someone who has disavowed it. 
Divided loyalty presents a more difficult case. On the one hand, 
we live in a world of overlapping and multiple allegiances - to ethnic 
group, home town, occupation, and baseball team. To stretch the fam-
ily analogy perhaps to the breaking point, divided allegiance may be 
no more troubling than holding allegiance to one's own family and 
one's "in-laws." At some point, however, the demands of conflicting 
loyalties may necessitate choice. (A person can fight for only one of 
two opposing armies.) It is not clear why a community, under the 
communitarian perspective, may not put a citizen to a choice when 
there exists an inescapable conflict in allegiances. In such a situation, 
the individual will suffer harm no matter what; conditions demand 
109. Consider the Sholem Aleichem story about Tevye the Dairyman who declares his 
daughter Chava dead for having married a Gentile. Her act was so foreign to the core identity 
and meaning of the family that she was no longer recognized as a member. 
110. Indeed, society may be the more aggrieved. "How sharper than a serpent's tooth .... " 
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that some part of self be sacrificed. The best that can be done is that 
the citizen be given a choice. 
The arguments from harm and responsibility would not seem to 
permit denationalization as a routine form of punishment - say, for 
failure to pay taxes, or for burglary. A communitarian perspective 
ought to recognize, to some extent, social causes of crime; and forgive-
ness for even serious misconduct is a central feature of family relation-
ships. Under the rights perspective, Chief Justice Warren's conclusion 
that denationalization is cruel and unusual punishment seemed vulner-
able. But the communitarian perspective exposes both the cruel (de-
struction of self) and unusual (families forgive, they don't banish) 
aspects of punishment. These considerations may explain why this na-
tion has rarely used denationalization as a form of punishment (and, 
interestingly, has done so only for loyalty-related crimes). Yet, at 
some point, I can imagine the communitarian argument running out. 
Some conduct may be so egregious, so outside the bounds of tolerable 
behavior, that the perpetrator may be seen as having disassociated 
himself from the community. "If he did that," the parent may con-
clude in extreme situations, "he is no son of mine." Or a club may feel 
justified in expelling the treasurer who embezzles funds. Unfortu-
nately, given the range of heinous crimes that this nation regularly 
experiences, it is not easy to say what acts would be so outre as to be 
"un-American." It may be that denationalization-as-punishment 
under the communitarian perspective makes sense only in closely knit, 
homogeneous communities. 
Finally, it is unlikely that a communitarian perspective, in the 
American context, would support denationalization on "public order" 
grounds. The harm and responsibility arguments have great force in 
situations where a citizen remains loyal to the state. Furthermore, 
other constitutional principles (such as the first amendment and the 
equal protection clause) would create insuperable barriers to attempts 
to expel groups. 111 
In sum, the communitarian perspective may do a good job of 
describing our intuitions about citizenship and the dramatic harm that 
denationalization entails. But it cannot serve as a foundation for con-
stitutional principles that leave loss of citizenship solely to the 
individual. 
111. Again, one can imagine that in a communitarian, rather than a liberal, society, public 
order grounds might be far more acceptable. To a society intent on preserving a particular reli-
gious, ethnic, or political character, groups that do not fit the mold are a threat to the commu-
nity's conception of self. 
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V. BEYOND INTENT-TO-RELINQUISH 
None of the perspectives we have examined provides an adequate 
theoretical foundation for the intent-to-relinquish test of Afroyim and 
Terrazas. The rights perspective gets us to the doctrine, but it is inter-
nally incoherent. Consent takes us no place. Contract and communi-
tarian theory cannot rule out state power to terminate citizenship 
against the will of the individual. Perhaps there are other possible ba-
ses for the current doctrine, but I am fairly convinced that the intent 
standard rests on no sound constitutional theory. The test seems to 
proceed from the Court's mistaken view that statelessness is a fate 
worse than death, 112 and its fear that the state would abuse any dena-
tionalization power it is recognized to have. Afroyim provides a 
bright-line prophylactic rule: to avoid serious harm and government 
overreaching, leave loss of citizenship to the individual. 
Our inability to find solid theoretical justifications for the current 
doctrine does not establish that the doctrine should be discarded. In a 
liberal democracy it may be appropriate to craft doctrine in favorem 
libertatis, and prophylactic rules are justifiable on efficiency terms. 
But I am not satisfied with this position. To me, the rule of Afroyim is 
based on a mistake of fact and an unsatisfactory rights logic. By con-
ceptualizing citizenship in rights terms, the current doctrine fails to 
capture the essential relational or organic nature of citizenship. Such 
thinking drives a false wedge between citizen and state and runs 
counter to our deepest intuitions about the nature of allegiances. 
The contract and communitarian perspectives, teased out of the 
Court's own language, start with an understanding of citizenship as a 
relationship among people or between people and the state. Both also 
provide a basis for the centrality of birthright citizenship in American 
nationality law. 113 Communitarian theory has the added benefit of of-
fering a coherent explanation for the (almost unconscious) importance 
most of us attach to citizenship. 
Yet neither perspective is compatible with the Court's answers in 
the denationalization cases. To the extent we are satisfied with the 
contractarian or communitarian explanation of citizenship, the doc-
trine ought to be adjusted to allow the state some authority to dena-
tionalize citizens. 
Such a change in doctrine may mean a greater change in conceptu-
alization than in result. Both perspectives support a strong presump-
112. Quite literally, given the Court's willingness to accept execution, but not denationaliza-
tion, of deserters. 
113. At least for children of citizens. 
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tion against the state's power to denationalize and would maintain 
much of the current doctrine's asymmetry. And neither perspective 
goes very far toward supporting denationalization on punishment or 
public order grounds. The contractarian and communitarian perspec· 
tives would, however, seem to permit denationalization for transfer of 
loyalty, disloyalty, and, in some cases, divided loyalty. 
Unfortunately, fancy theory does not usually suggest concrete doc· 
trine; and fancy theory only vaguely related to the document it pur· 
ports to explain may (to update an old cliche) have the hum of the 
word processor. The problem, of course, is to tum the insights of the 
contractarian and communitarian approaches into constitutional doc· 
trine. The thrust of both analyses is reorientation of doctrine away 
from intent·to-relinquish and toward notions of allegiance. But there 
are very serious risks in making this move without careful thought. 
Shifting to an allegiance-based understanding of denationalization 
will naturally lead to government investigations of the loyalty of citi-
zens. The State Department's brief in the Kahane case is an ugly ex-
ample of what can happen when constitutional standards tum on 
proof of allegiance. The Department combed Kahane's speeches and 
writings in an attempt to prove that his true allegiance lay with 
Israel. 114 The chilling effect that such an approach may have on 
speech and conduct ought to be apparent. We are not so many years 
beyond the McCarthy era, when minor incidents were taken as proof 
of disloyalty. And how many Americans, in opposing the war in Viet-
nam, were told to "go back to Russia"? I do not think I am being 
unduly alarmist to suggest that the State Department's brief in the 
Kahane case takes us a few steps down the wrong road. 115 
One answer - and I think the correct one - is to insist that dena-
tionalization be based on conduct, not belief. That is, Congress ought 
to be restricted to identifying specific acts that demonstrate lapsed, 
transferred, or divided allegiance. But even here we must be careful. 
Past experience indicates that Congress might either make too-easy 
assumptions that particular conduct evidences lost allegiance (e.g., de-
sertion), or disguise public order grounds as allegiance grounds (e.g., 
voting in a foreign election). The history of the denationalization stat-
utes, combined with the harms imposed by loss of nationality, suggests 
that the Court ought not to defer to congressional judgments as to 
what conduct constitutes a loss of allegiance. It should insist that de-
114. See State Department Brief, supra note 5, at 25-30. 
115. Of course, proving only transfer of allegiance is not enough. The government must also 
show that the citizen has performed one of the expatriating acts identified in section 349 of the 
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982). 
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nationalization categories fit as perfectly as possible allegience-based 
justifications for l~ss of citizenship. 
Under this analysis, it may be possible to craft narrow denationali-
zation grounds for transferred allegiance. For example, Congress 
ought to be able to provide for loss of nationality when a citizen has 
voluntarily renounced U.S. citizenship, particularly if he or she has 
taken citizenship elsewhere.116 But naturalization in another country, 
by itself, can hardly be deemed to indicate a transfer of allegiance. 
People may seek citizenship in other countries in order to remain with 
family members or obtain employment. Such conduct in many (if not 
most) cases says little about continued allegiance to the United States. 
Other conduct, such as service in a foreign military or voting abroad, 
is equally unreliable evidence of transferred allegiance. · 
It may be difficult to define categories of conduct evidencing loss of 
allegiance. Perhaps joining the army of an invading enemy or working 
for the violent overthrow of the state may properly be seen as indicat-
ing no further attachment to the community. But even here, as several 
readers of this article have suggested, such assumptions are problem-
atic. If allegiance is understood not as loyalty to the government but 
rather as attachment to the core principles of a community, then aid-
ing in the overthrow of a government that had demonstrated a "lack 
of allegiance" to the Constitution would indicate no loss of allegiance. 
Beyond these treason-type grounds, it is even harder to identify con-
duct that necessarily demonstrates lapsed allegiance. Tax evaders, de-
serters in wartime, and participants in organized crime may be 
contemptible citizens, but it is quite clear that people may engage in 
these activities without having lost allegiance to this country.117 The 
prior analysis suggests that neither overinclusive categories nor spe-
cific inquiries into allegiance ought to be tolerated. 118 
A similar approach ought to be applied to divided allegiance situa-
tions. We ought to be suspicious of governmental assertions about the 
degree of allegiance a citizen holds. However, some objective indicia 
may disclose cases where the maintenance of two allegiances becomes 
untenable. The State Department's Board of Appellate Review has 
adopted this kind of test in ruling on denationalization cases following 
116. Here the intent-to-relinquish and allegiance-based theories would overlap. 
117. Consider, for example, the facts in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Trop was a 
private in the U.S. Army serving in French Morocco. He had been placed in a stockade due to a 
breach of discipline. He escaped from confinement, but willingly surrendered to an officer on an 
Army vehicle while he was walking back towards his base. His "desertion" lasted less than a 
day. 
118. I recognize that this is as much a prophylactic rule as the one derived from the rights 
perspective. But at least it is based on a plausible account of both citizenship and the real world. 
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Terrazas. According to a study of more than one hundred Board deci-
sions, "the Board ... analyzes each case [where no renunciatory oath 
is present] to ascertain whether the expatriatory act 'would render it 
impossible for [the citizen] to perform the obligations of U.S. citizen-
ship.' " 119 I make no claim that it is going to be easy to decide what 
conduct presents such a conflict of allegiances. 120 But the test does 
three things properly: it captures a set of cases beyond the set of the 
intent-to-relinquish test that, under my analysis, ought to be permissi-
ble grounds for denationalization; it puts the burden on the govern-
ment to establish the conflict; and it makes irrelevant the state-of-mind 
evidence used by the State Department in the Kahane case. 
How does all this play out in the case of Meir Kahane? The mere 
assumption of a seat in a foreign government ought not to be one of 
the per se categories of transferred or lapsed allegiance. Indeed, the 
Board of Appellate Review has already so concluded in the case of 
another Knesset member. 121 Thus Kahane's case should be judged 
under the "conflict" test for divided allegiance. That is, the case ought 
to be decided by comparing the duties of a Knesset member with the 
obligations of U.S. citizenship. 
Oddly enough, the Board of Appellate Review spoke to this issue 
in purporting to decide whether or not Kahane intended to relinquish 
U.S. citizenship. Its reasoning seemed to be that if a citizen assumes a 
position that necessarily entails a conflict of loyalties then she must be 
deemed to have intended to give up her prior loyalty: "Conceptually 
119. Note, United States Loss of Citizenship Law After Terrazas: Decisions of the Board of 
Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POL. 829, 878 (1984) (quoting In re PAD, Bd. App. 
Rev. 6 (Sept. 29, 1982)). Why the Board thinks this is an appropriate test for intent is unclear. 
120. It seems reasonably clear that dual nationality alone does not normally present any 
irreconcilable conflicts in allegiance. 
121. In re M.F. (Dept. of State, Board of Appellate Review, Jan. 29, 1982), discussed in 
Kahane at 12. The Board of Appellate Review characterized this case in its Kahane decision as 
follows: 
In re MF. turned on what the majority (one member dissented) called "very thin edges of 
highly unusual circumstances" mainly because of the following considerations: M.F. had 
gained her seat in the Knesset only because the Civil Rights party had won an unexpected 
number of seats, she being third on the list of candidates; M.F. appeared rarely in the Knes-
set and when she did, was mainly active on women's rights issues; she did not involve herself 
in the broader political issues in Israel. Although the Board found that M.F.'s service in the 
Knesset was "highly persuasive of a manifest intent to relinquish her United States citizen· 
ship and that very unusual circumstances would be required to overcome the presumption 
of intent to abandon her allegiance to the United States," the majority opinion emphasized 
M.F.'s lack of any "significant participation in the political community prior to the election, 
and saw nothing in her dedication to women's rights issues while serving in the Knesset that 
signified a conflict with or abandonment of allegiance to the United States. On balance, the 
majority considered that the record left the issue of appellant's voluntary relinquishment of 
her United States citizenship "to some extent in doubt.'' The Board accordingly resolved 
the doubt in favor of continuation of citizenship. 
Kahane at 12. 
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and functionally, serving in the legislature of a foreign state, 
friendly or not, is on its face inconsistent with an intent to retain 
United States citizenship. The potential for constant clash of loyalties 
is as limitless as it is obvious."122 Putting aside the Board's (unsus-
tainable) conclusion about intent, 123 the Board offers no support for its 
ipse dixit regarding the "potential" for a "clash of loyalties." I do not 
claim that no such clash is conceivable. I would, however, require the 
State Department to be quite specific in detailing the obligations of 
U.S. citizenship that a member of the Israeli Knesset cannot fulfill. 124 
Until the Department meets that burden, under my analysis, Meir 
Kahane ought to remain a citizen of the United States. 
Of course, there is no small irony in this conclusion. It means that 
the Constitution ought to protect Meir Kahane from precisely the 
kind of harm that he would inflict upon hundreds of thousands of 
Arabs now living in Israel. 
122. Kahane at 12. 
123. Surely one can seek elective office in a foreign country and still intend to maintain the 
benefits of U.S. citizenship. 
124. For example, membership in the legislature of a nation at war with the United States 
would raise "obvious" conflicts of loyalty. But little short of this is "obvious." Indeed, the 
Board's decision not to denationalize another Knesset member, see note 121 supra, makes its 
categorical assertion here incoherent. 
